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AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS AND ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION BIRTHS
Jeffrey A. Parness *
I. INTRODUCTION
Childbirth can, of course, arise from sex. It can also arise from
assisted reproduction, 1 which, to date, usually involves either “the
introduction of semen . . . into a woman’s vagina, cervical canal or uterus
through . . . artificial means,” 2 the process of artificial insemination (AI),
or the introduction of a fertilized egg into a woman “using gametes” that
are not the woman’s “own,” in the process of fertilized egg introduction
(FEI). 3 State laws generally govern childcare parentage in the United
States for children born of sex, AI, or FEI, 4 but there are some federal
*
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1. State law definitions of assisted reproduction can be problematically limited. See, e.g., VA.
C ODE ANN. § 20-156 (West 2019) (“assisted reproduction means a pregnancy resulting from any
intervening medical technology . . . which completely or partially replaces sexual intercourse as a
means of conception.” The statute fails to account for do-it-yourself artificial insemination (as with a
turkey baster).
2. IDAHO C ODE § 39-540(1) (defining artificial insemination). Artificial insemination can
involve a woman who intends to rear the child, or a woman who does not intend to rear the child, i.e.,
a genetic surrogate. UNIFORM P ARENTAGE ACT § 701 (nonsurrogacy AI) & § 801(1) (surrogacy AI)
(2017) (“2017 UPA”).
3. 2017 UPA § 801(2) (defining gestational surrogate as limited to a woman who does not
intend to rear the child). See also VA. C ODE ANN. § 20-156 (“gestational mother means the woman
who gives birth to a child, regardless of her genetic relationship to the child”); VA. C ODE ANN. § 20158 (“gestational mother” is “the child’s mother under law unless she is a surrogate”).
4. This paper focuses on parentage interests in the “care, custody, and control” of AI children,
interests that receive federal constitutional protections. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)
(while the children in Troxel were born of consensual sex, there is no good reason to treat AI children
differently, especially as only in AI settings do the participants almost always intend pregnancy to
follow). Parentage responsibilities, as with child support, that follow such births might differ in their
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guidelines. 5 The balance in state lawmaking between legislatures and
courts for any particular form of birth varies interstate. The balance within
a single state also often varies depending on the form of birth, including
children born of sex, of nonsurrogacy AI, of nonsurrogacy FEI, of
surrogacy AI (i.e., a genetic surrogate), or of surrogacy FEI (i.e., a
gestational surrogate).
State parentage laws for children born of sex have changed in the last
half century through recognitions of voluntary acknowledgment,
residency/hold out, and de facto parent doctrines. State laws on children
born of surrogacy pacts involving FEI have also evolved. Enforceable FEI
surrogacy pacts provide an avenue to childcare parenthood for some while
recognizing a waiver of childcare interests by others; here, guidelines
usually require medical aid, and perhaps judicial oversight. At least for
now, there are no do-it-yourselfers (DIY) undertaking FEI births.
Pregnancy cannot be accomplished by following a YouTube video.
State laws on children born of nonsurrogacy and surrogacy AI have
also evolved. As with surrogacy FEI births, these laws often speak of AI
with medical oversight. But there can be, and have been, many DIY
pregnancies. Thank you YouTube. To date there is no comprehensive
constitutional, statutory, or common law guidance on parentage arising
from AI births involving DIYers.
Childcare parentage issues arising from AI births are subject to
constitutional guidance, including due process, equal protection, and
privacy dictates. Constitutional rights, however, sometimes go
unrecognized in AI laws, particularly for same sex couples, wed and
unwed, as well as for single women. Upon a brief review of contemporary
American state AI laws, current and future constitutional precedents are
explored. Constitutional, as well as public policy, reforms are particularly
needed for same-sex female couples and single women employing AI as
intended parents.
II. CONTEMPORARY AI PARENTAGE LAWS
The significant variations in contemporary childcare parentage laws
covering AI births are well illustrated by reviewing the Idaho Artificial
Insemination Act (AIA) and the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).

parenthood definitions. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew Timko, De Facto Parent and
Nonparent Child Support Orders, 67 AM. U. L. R EV. 769, 797-800 (2018).
5. The limited federal guidelines are reviewed in Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal Constitutional
Childcare Parents, 90 S T. JOHN’S L. R EV. 965 (2016).
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Idaho laws, as well as some other state laws, 6 follow the 1973 UPA on AI
births, and are quite limited, leaving open significant constitutional
questions. The 2017 UPA is more comprehensive, though it too prompts
some questions.
A. Idaho Artificial Insemination Act
In Idaho there are no statutes or precedents on parentage for children
born of surrogacy FEI or surrogacy AI. 7 Nonsurrogacy AI births are
addressed in statutes that contemplate parentage for the person giving
birth and her husband. 8 A 2021 Idaho Supreme Court decision, relying on
the U.S. Supreme Court marriage equality dictate for same sex couples,
deemed married lesbian couples were also governed by the statutes. 9
Under the Idaho statutes, “only” licensed physicians and “persons
under their supervision may select artificial insemination donors and
perform artificial insemination.” 10 The statutes cover only semen
introduction involving a donor, 11 defined as a man who is not “the
husband of the woman upon whom the artificial insemination is
performed.” 12 Upon donor selection, AI “shall not be performed upon a
woman without her prior written request and consent and the prior written
request and consent of her husband.” 13 Where the physician performing
AI does not deliver a conceived child, “it is the duty of the mother and her
husband” to give “notice” to that physician of the child’s birth. 14 A child’s
AI birth following such AI establishes the same “relationship, rights, and
obligations” in the husband “as if the child had been naturally and
legitimately conceived by the mother and the mother’s husband.” 15 The
Idaho AI statutes apply to “all persons conceived as a result of artificial
6. See, e.g., ALA. C ODE § 26-17-704(a); MONT. C ODE ANN. § 40-6-106(1); TEX. F AM. C ODE
§ 160.704(a); MINN. S TAT. § 257.56(1); C OLO. R EV. S TAT. § 19-4-106(1); UTAH C ODE ANN. § 78B15-704.
7. See, e.g., In re Doe, 372 P.3d 1106 (Idaho 2016) (no judicial authority to declare parentage
of a child born to gestational carrier in absence of statute); see also Doe v. Doe, 395 P.3d 1287 (Idaho
2017) (former unwed female partner has no legally recognized interest in a child born to her partner
via AI).
8. IDAHO C ODE § 39-5403(1).
9. Gatsby v. Gatsby, 495 P.3d 996, 1002-03 (Idaho 2021) (under Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. 644 (2015), which requires state recognitions of same-sex marriages, the Idaho AI statute applies
to “opposite-sex and same-sex couples in the exact same manner”).
10. IDAHO C ODE § 39-5402.
11. Id. § 39-5401(1).
12. Id. § 39-5401(2).
13. Id. § 39-5403(1).
14. Id. § 39-5403(2).
15. Id. § 39-5405(3).
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insemination as defined” therein. 16 It is a misdemeanor17 for any “person”
to violate the statutory provisions on physician-only AI; 18 on requests,
consents and notices regarding AI birth; 19 and, on donors. 20
B. 2017 Uniform Parentage Act
The 2017 UPA, implemented in some states, 21 is far different in its
approach to childcare parentage in AI births. It is also far more progressive
than its 1973 or 2000 UPA counterparts.
1. Nonsurrogacy AI Births
As for nonsurrogacy AI births, the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA) only recognizes a limited form of assisted reproduction, which
embodies an AI birth undertaken by a married, opposite sex couple who
employed “a licensed physician” and “semen donated by a man” other
than the husband. 22 The donor here is always “treated in law as if he were
not the natural father.” 23 The husband is only “treated in law as if he were
the natural father” if insemination occurred “under the supervision of a
licensed physician and with the consent” of the husband. 24 As noted, the
Idaho statute is comparable. 25
The 2000 UPA expands parentage opportunities for those involved
in births not arising from sex, speaking to “assisted reproduction” and not
just AI. 26 It authorizes parentage for sperm donors and for nondonor men
who consent to AI “with the intent to be the parent.” 27 Such men are
16. Id. § 39-5406 (except for judicial decrees entered before the effective date of the AI statutes,
which were first enacted in 1982).
17. Id. § 39-5407.
18. Id. § 39-5402.
19. Id. § 39-5403.
20. Id. § 39-5404.
21. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS §15-8-101; WASH. R EV. C ODE 26.26A.005. Where chiefly
implemented, the 2017 UPA is not always strictly followed. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8.1-101
to 15-8.1-1004 (no paternity registry provision); WASH. R EV. C ODE § 26.26A.005–26.26A.904 (no
paternity registry provision).
22. UNIFORM P ATERNITY ACT § 5(a) (1973) (“1973 UPA”).
23. Id. § 5(b).
24. Id. § 5(a).
25. IDAHO C ODE § 39-5402 (physicians and persons under their supervision); Id. §39-5403(1)
(husband and wife must request and consent).
26. The 2000 UPA defines assisted reproduction as involving “pregnancy” other than by sexual
intercourse, including pregnancy by intrauterine insemination, donation of eggs, donation of embryos,
IVF and transfer of embryos, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection. UNIFORM P ATERNITY ACT §
102(4) (2000) (“2000 UPA”).
27. 2000 UPA§ 703-704 (consent “must be in a record” and signed by the man and the woman
to receive AI).
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expecting legal parents whose parentage arises when children are born. 28
The “husband” of a “wife” who gives birth via AI has limited
opportunities to “challenge his paternity.” 29 The 2000 UPA is generally
followed in some states, 30 though some of its proposed laws are subject to
significant challenges. 31
The 2017 UPA further expands parentage opportunities in
nonsurrogacy AI settings. That act is “substantially similar” to the 2000
UPA, but is updated to apply “equally to same-sex couples.” 32 Thus, an
“individual” who consents to “assisted reproduction by a woman, with the
intent to be a parent of a child conceived by the assisted reproduction,” is
a parent of the child. 33 With a nonsurrogacy AI birth having no such
consenting individual, the spouse of the person giving birth has limited
opportunities to challenge the spouse’s parentage. 34
For there to be two legal parents at birth for a nonsurrogacy AI child,
the 2017 UPA requires that the consent to parentage be signed “in a
record” by the person giving birth and “an individual who intends to be a
parent,” though the “record” need not be certified by a physician. 35
Seemingly, “consent in a record” can be undertaken “before, on, or after
birth of the child.” 36 A lack of such consent does not foreclose, however,
childcare parentage for an intended parent where there is clear-andconvincing evidence of an “express agreement” between the individual
and the person giving birth “entered before conception.”37 As well, a lack
28. Id. § 703 (“a parent of the resulting child”).
29. Id. § 705. One opportunity involves a lack of consent, “before or after birth of the child,”
shown in a proceeding brought “within two years after learning of the birth.” Id. § 705(a). Another
opportunity involves a challenge at any time where there was either no sperm donation or no consent;
no cohabitation “since the probable time of assisted reproduction;” and no open hold out of the child
as one’s own. Id. § 705(b).
30. See, e.g., 13 DEL. C ODE § 8-703(a); WYO. S TAT. ANN. § 14-2-903.
31. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE LAW J. 2260 (2017) (with
useful charts and citations on American state assisted reproduction laws).
32. 2017 UPA, Art. 7, cmt.
33. 2017 UPA § 703(a).
34. Id. § 705(a) (spouse “at the time of the child’s birth”).
35. Id. § 704(a). Compare C AL. F AM. C ODE § 7613(a)(1) (“consent shall be in writing”) and §
7613(a)(2) (intended parent by preconception “oral agreement” is shown by clear and convincing
evidence).
36. 2017 UPA § 704(b).
37. Id. § 704(b)(1). It may be sensible that an “express agreement” undertaken postconception
does not prompt comparable childcare parentage. Here, there is much greater certainty that a child
will be born so that an agreement is far less speculative. Perhaps instead of a postconception but
prebirth agreement, the 2017 UPA contemplated a postconception but prebirth VAP, as it recognizes
an “intended parent” can sign a VAP. Yet, an “intended parent” in many states has no prebirth VAP
access where there is followed the 1973 UPA or 2000 UPA which only authorize postbirth (paternity)
VAPs. 1973 UPA § 4(b) (“paternity” acknowledgment “of the child” in a “writing filed with” the
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of consent in a record and a lack of an express agreement does not
foreclose an individual’s parentage where the child was held out as the
individual’s own in the child’s first two years. 38 The nonparental status of
one married to a person giving birth to a nonsurrogacy AI child, even if a
gamete donor, may be established by a showing of a lack of consent, a
lack of any agreement, or a lack of any holding out of the child as one’s
own. 39
As noted, the nonsurrogacy AI parentage norms in each of the UPAs
are now reflected in state statutes. 40 Further, there are state common law
precedents untethered to statutes that are similar to the UPA provisions. 41
There are significant interstate variations. 42
So, childcare parentage for those giving birth and for intended
parents in nonsurrogacy AI settings can arise from express consents.
There could be, but there generally are no, state forms guiding, if not
mandating, usage. In California in nonsurrogacy AI settings, there are
statutorily-recommended consent forms that may be used, but are not
required. 43
state, which is not disputed by “the mother”); 2000 UPA § 301 (“man claiming to be the genetic father
of the child” signs together with the “mother of a child”).
38. 2017 UPA § 704(b)(2).
39. Id. § 705.
40. American state statutes include: TEX. F AM. C ODE § 160.7031 (fatherhood for unwed man,
intending to be father, who provides sperm to licensed physician and consents to the use of that sperm
for assisted reproduction by an unwed woman, where consent is in a record signed by man and woman
and kept by the physician); N.H. R EV. S TAT. § 5-C:30(I)(b) (unwed mother has sperm donor
“identified on birth record” where “an affidavit of paternity” has been executed); 13 DEL. C ODE § 8704(a) (“Consent by a woman and a man who intends to be a parent of a child born to the woman by
assisted reproduction must be in a record signed by the woman and the man.”); WYO. S TAT. § 14-2904(a) (like Delaware); N.M. S TAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (“A person who provides eggs, sperm, or
embryos for or consents to assisted reproduction as provided in Section 704 [“record signed . . . before
the placement”] . . . with the intent to be the parent of a child is a parent of the resulting child”).
41. Precedents include: Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. App. 2009) (to avoid
constitutional infirmity, assisted reproduction statute as written solely for married opposite sex couple
applied to same sex domestic partners); Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Cal. App. 2d
2014)(though the statute (both pre-2011 and post-2011) indicated explicitly a lack of paternity for this
particular semen donor when his unwed partner delivered a child conceived via assisted reproduction,
the statute on presumed parentage for one (either male or female) who receives a child into the home
and openly holds out the child as one’s own natural child can support–in certain circumstances–legal
paternity for the semen donor); Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217 (Ok. 2015) (unwritten preconception
agreement prompts in loco parentis childcare status for former lesbian partner of birth mother, though
she contributed no genetic material); In re Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E. 3d 488 (N.Y.
2016) (agreement between lesbian partners can prompt parentage in non-birth mother).
42. The nonsurrogacy AI laws are reviewed and critiqued, in Deborah H. Forman, Exploring
the Boundaries of Families Created with Known Sperm Donors: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 19 P ENN.
J. L. & S OC. C HANGE 41 (2016).
43. C AL. F AM. C ODE § 7613.5(d) (forms on assisted reproduction pacts by two married or by
two unmarried people, where signatories may or may not have used their own genetic material to
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As noted, the 2017 UPA recognizes nonsurrogacy AI parentage
where there is no consent “in a record” if there is either an express
agreement on intended parenthood or there is actual residency/hold out
parental-like conduct in the child’s first two years. 44 Perhaps as well, one
can attain nonsurrogacy AI parenthood by establishing de facto parentage,
which requires no residency with the child in the child’s first two years. 45
2. Surrogacy AI Births
As for surrogacy AI births, the 1973 UPA only speaks to AI
involving a wife, her nondonor husband, and a semen donor who is treated
“as if he were not the natural father.” 46 A comment declares the act “does
not deal with many complex, and serious legal problems raised by the
practice of artificial insemination.” 47
The 2000 UPA, by contrast, has separate articles on children of
assisted reproduction and children of gestational agreements. 48 The
article on assisted reproduction does not apply to a birth “as the result of
a gestational agreement.” 49 Such an agreement, “whether in a record or
not, that is not judicially validated is not enforceable.” 50 Births arising
from nonvalidated gestational agreements are governed by the article on
the “parent-child relationship,” which deems the woman giving birth to
be the legal parent, together with a man (i.e., “father”) who was married
to the birth mother at the time of birth, who signed a VAP, who consented
to AI, or who was adjudicated a parent in a paternity suit (i.e., has genetic
ties). 51

prompt a pregnancy). See also Jeffrey A. Parness, Formal Declarations of Intended Childcare
Parentage, 92 NOTRE DAME L. R EV. ONLINE S UPP. 87 (Mar. 30, 2017) (urging more states to create
such forms).
44. 2017 UPA § 704(b).
45. Id. § 609 (only one claiming de facto parentage can seek establishment). See Jeffrey A.
Parness, Comparable Pursuits of Hold Out and De Facto Parentage: Tweaking the 2017 Uniform
Parentage Act, 31 J. ACAD. MATR. LAWS. 157, 169-73 (2018) (urging broader standing for those who
seek de facto parentage). Under the 2017 UPA, de facto parentage is only unavailable in a proceeding
“to adjudicate the parentage of a child born under a surrogacy agreement.” 2017 UPA § 601(b).
46. 1973 UPA § 5.
47. 1973 UPA, cmt. at 5 (indicates “further consideration of other aspects” of AI was urged,
citing Walter Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Danger of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64 NW . UNIV.
L. R EV. 777, 793-97, 807 (1970) (urging state laws on AI after reviewing some early statutes starting
in the mid-1960s)).
48. 2000 UPA, Art. 7 (Child of Assisted Reproduction) & 8 (Gestational Agreement).
49. 2000 UPA § 701.
50. 2000 UPA § 809(a).
51. 2000 UPA § 809(b) (referencing § 201).
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The 2017 UPA similarly has separate articles on assisted
reproduction and surrogacy agreements. 52 But it also has special parts for
gestational surrogacy agreements and agenetic surrogacy agreements. 53
For each type of surrogacy agreement, pregnancy results from “assisted
reproduction.” 54 AI is employed only with “genetic” surrogacy, where a
woman, who “is not an intended parent,” agrees to “become pregnant”
through AI while “using her own gamete” pursuant to an “agreement as
provided” in the Act. 55 A genetic surrogacy agreement must, inter alia,
conform to eligibility norms for any surrogate and any intended parents
(who need not be “genetically related”); 56 be in “a record;”57 be
undertaken with “independent legal representation; 58 be “executed before
a medical procedure occurs related to the agreement, other than “medical
evaluation and mental health consultation;” 59 and, usually be “validated”
by a court before any AI related to the agreement. 60 A genetic surrogacy
agreement can be terminated by an intended parent by notice “any time
before a gamete or embryo transfer.” 61 Such an agreement can be
terminated by the genetic surrogate “any time before 72 hours” after the
AI birth. 62 An unvalidated genetic surrogacy agreement, where there is no
withdrawal of consent within 72 hours of birth, does not necessarily lead
to parentage under law in the woman giving birth. 63

52. 2017 UPA §§ 701 et seq. (Assisted Reproduction) & 801 et seq. (Surrogacy Agreement).
53. 2017 UPA §§ 813-18 (genetic surrogacy), §§ 808-12 (gestational surrogacy).
54. 2017 UPA § 804(a)(1).
55. 2017 UPA § 801(1). Gestational surrogacy, by contrast, has the woman giving birth
achieving pregnancy through “gametes that are not her own” (FEI). 2017 UPA § 801(2).
56. 2017 UPA § 802(a) & (b).
57. 2017 UPA § 803(4).
58. 2017 UPA § 803(7).
59. 2017 UPA § 803(9).
60. 2017 UPA § 813(a). Exceptions include settings where “all parties agree” that court
validation could occur after AI, but before birth. 2017 UPA § 816(b). Where the genetic surrogate
withdraws consent to an unvalidated agreement within 72 hours of birth, parentage is adjudicated,
with possible approaches including birth mother parentage, spousal parentage, residency/hold out
parentage, VAP parentage, and de facto parentage. 2017 UPA § 816(c) (referencing Articles 1-6 of
2017 UPA). Where there is no validated agreement and no such withdrawal, an adjudication of
parentage depends upon assessments of the best interests of the child (with relevant factors in 2017
UPA § 613(a)) and “the intent of the parties.” 2017 UPA § 816(d).
Preinsemination court orders validating genetic surrogacy pacts differ from preinsemination and
postinsemination but prebirth court orders declaring legal parentage of later born children. See, e.g.,
Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders in Surrogacy
Proceedings, 39 F AM. L. Q. 633 (2005) (reviewing availability of such orders in several states).
61. 2017 UPA § 814(a)(1).
62. 2017 UPA § 814(a)(2).
63. 2017 UPA § 816(d).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN PARENTAGE FOR AI BIRTHS
American state statutes and judicial precedents chiefly govern
childcare parentage, that is, parent status under law for child custody,
visitation, and/or parental responsibility allocation purposes. 64 Of course,
these laws cannot infringe upon individual federal or state constitutional
interests, including rights tied to due process, equal protection, and
privacy. 65 One such infringing statute is the Idaho Artificial Insemination
Act. When this act was challenged, the Idaho high court found only
limited constitutional infringement. 66 But the act is far more problematic
than was indicated. The court ruling, once reviewed, will be used to
illustrate the span of constitutional issues arising under AI statutes,
including laws grounded on the varying UPAs.
A. Reading the Idaho Artificial Insemination Act
In Gatsby v. Gatsby, two women, Linsay and Kylee, were married in
June 2015. 67 Deciding to have a child through the artificial insemination
of Kylee “using semen donated by a mutual friend,” the women proceeded
“without using the services of a physician” and “without consulting an
attorney.” 68 The couple did sign with the friend “an artificial insemination
agreement Linsay found online, listing the friend as ‘donor’ and both
Linsay and Kylee as the ‘recipient’.” 69 The pact said the donor “would not
have parental rights or obligations to the child.” 70
64. Legal parentage is contextual so that it can vary between different settings.
Nonconstitutional, nonstatutory common law precedents and statutes can significantly differ in
childcare, tort and probate. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Who Is A Parent? Intrastate and Interstate
Differences, 34 J. AM. ACAD. MAT. LAWS. ___ (forthcoming 2022).
65. State constitutions can go further in guaranteeing equal protection. See, e.g., ILL. C ONST.
art. 1, § 18 (no unequal protection by state or its units of local government and school districts due to
“sex”); TEX. C ONST. art. 1, § 3a (“self-operative” amendment declaring no denial of equality “becau s e
of race, color, creed, or national origin”); KAN. C ONST. art. 15, § 6 (women have “equal rights in the
possession of their children”). While the federal constitution has no explicit recognition of individual
privacy interests, some state constitutions do; thus, constitutional privacy interests beyond those
arising under due process and equal protection can limit state AI parentage laws. See, e.g., C AL.
C ONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people . . . have . . . inalienable rights” which include “happiness” and
“privacy”); WASH. C ONST. art. 1, § 7 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs . . . without
authority of law”). There also may be other possible constitutional interests in AI parentage laws, like
the right to travel for intended parents (e.g., for those seeking surrogacy parenthood unavailable at
home) and the right of guaranteeing children to know about, if not have relationships with, those with
whom they have genetic ties (not unlike informational interests for children formally adopted)).
66. Gatsby v. Gatsby, 495 P.3d 996, 1002-03 (Idaho 2021).
67. Id. at 999.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Linsay performed the insemination in the couple’s home. 71 Kylee
gave birth on October 29, 2016. 72 The birth certificate listed both Linsay
and Kylee as “mother.” 73 The child lived with the women “who held
themselves out as the child’s parents” until the Summer of 2017 when the
women physically fought, leading to a domestic battery conviction for
Kylee and a July 2017 no contact order “which prohibited Kylee from
seeing her child except at daycare.” 74 Linsay filed for divorce in August
2017, whereupon Kylee asserted Linsay had no legal claim or standing to
any custody or visitation. 75
Linsay had sole custody of the child from July 3 to December 27,
2017, at which time an order of “equal custody” was entered. 76 Custody
was shared until November 2018, when a magistrate court granted Kylee
“sole custody,” upon finding that “Linsay was not the child’s legal parent”
and that Linsay “had established no third-party rights.” It also found that
it was not in the child’s best interests for Linsay to have any custody or
visitation. 77
While Linsay was deemed a presumptive spousal parent due to her
marriage to Kylee at the time of birth, the magistrate found the
presumption overcome by the fact that Linsay “is not [the child’s]
biological parent.” 78 The magistrate found Linsay could have attained
legal parenthood via “a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity
affidavit” (VAP), but did not do so. 79 The magistrate also found Linsay
did not adopt the child and “did not comply with the Artificial
Insemination Act (AIA).”80 Upon affirmance by a district court, an appeal
went to the Idaho Supreme Court.
The high court did not address whether Linsay could have completed
a VAP. 81 Yet it strongly hinted that such a VAP was unavailable to Linsay

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 999-1000. The child was not identified “due to privacy concerns.” Id. at 999 n.1.
75. Id. at 1000.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (IDAHO C ODE § 7-1106 (1), within Paternity Act). VAPs that are later discussed herein
encompass all forms of voluntary parentage acknowledgements, however denominated and whoever
may be explicitly recognized as VAP signatories, including those without alleged or actual biological
ties, as with Linsay. See, e.g., 15 VT. S TAT. § 310 (2019) (signing of an “acknowledgement of
parentage” by the person who gave birth and “an intended parent”).
80. Gatsby, 495 P.3d at 1000.
81. Id. at 1007.
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for the AIA was “controlling” due to the use of AI. 82 Further, the Idaho
“common law marital presumption of paternity” was deemed inapplicable
because the AIA controlled, 83 not because the presumption only applied
to men. The court did not address the issue of Linsay’s “third-party
standing” under law for nonparental childcare. 84 The court did affirm the
conclusion on “the child’s best interest for Kylee to be awarded sole
custody,” 85 perhaps making its legal conclusions on the AIA merely
dicta. 86 The court also affirmed the “holding that Linsay could not obtain
parental rights . . . under the AIA because she did not comply with all the
requirements of the law.” 87 Finally, the court agreed that Linsay could
have avoided the case outcome by adopting the child, 88 recognizing at
least one exception to the controlling status of the AIA.
B. Controlling/Exclusive AI Statutes
Reading AI statutes generally to be the controlling/exclusive avenues
to parent status for intended parents who do not give birth, as the Gatsby
court did with the Idaho AIA, leaves many prospective parents with only
the options of a formal adoption (a costly venture) or a nonparental
childcare order (a costly venture even when available). Prospective
parents were also not afforded much insight by the high court on what
would have constituted “prior written request and consent” by Kylee and
82. Id. at 1002 (AIA “is controlling” as it is a “more specific statute” than the Paternity Act,
IDAHO C ODE § 7-1101 et seq., which contains the VAP norms, at §§ 7-1106 & 1007).
83. Id. at 1002. Compare McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492, 501-02 (Ariz. 2017) (same sex
female spouse can equitably estop a birth mother’s attempt to override a spousal parentag e
presumption) with Doherty v. Leon, 472 P.3d 531, 538-39 (Ariz. App. 2020) (sperm donor equitably
estopped from seeking parentage of AI child born to a married female couple).
84. Gatsby, 495 P.3d at 1010 (“any error in the . . . third party standing analysis was cured
because the magistrate court nevertheless addressed whether giving Linsay custody rights would be
in the child’s best interest”). Third party standing had been sought under Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775
P.2d 611, 613 (Idaho 1989) (common law guidelines on a nonparent (there a stepparent) overcoming
a natural parent’s custodial rights). Gatsby, 495 P.3d at 1010. On third party statutory standing of a
nonparent to seek child visitation, see, e.g., IDAHO C ODE § 32-1703 (“de facto custodian” who must
be “related to a child within the third degree of consanguinity”); IDAHO C ODE § 32-717(3)
(grandparents); IDAHO C ODE § 32-719 (grandparents and great grandparents); IDAHO C ODE § 15-5204 (guardianship proceeding).
85. Gatsby, 495 P.3d at 1007.
86. See, e.g., Smith v. Angell, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (Idaho 1992) (Bistline, J., concurring)
(obiter dictum and dictum involve court pronouncements not essential to the court’s determination);
see also City of Weippe v. Yarno, 528 P.2d 201, 205 (Idaho 1974) (high court is not bound by its own
earlier dicta).
87. Gatsby, 495 P.3d at 1004. The AIA bar to Linsay, the natural mother’s spouse, was
foreshadowed in Doe v. Doe, 395 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Idaho 2017) (AIA bar applied to natural mother’s
former female partner).
88. Gatsby, 495 P.3d at 1007.
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Linsay. Further, Idaho legislators arguably did not contemplate AI do-ityourselfers since the AIA limited AI performance to licensed
“physicians” and “persons under their supervision.” 89 As well, intended
parents were teased with the potential for nonparental childcare standing,
though relevant statutes and precedents seem unaccommodating to the
likes of Linsay. 90
Surely controlling/exclusive statutes could address the norms for all
who undertake AI. But where statutes do not, they should reference other
possible avenues to parenthood in AI births for those not included, like a
husband who intends to parent a child born of AI to his wife with the use
of his semen. 91 The Idaho AIA spoke specifically only to married couples
who employed “physicians.” The “controlling” nature of this statute, as
read in Gatsby, presents difficulties for do-it-yourselfers, as well as for
both unmarried couples and single women pursuing AI parentage,
whether or not physicians are used.
To avoid constitutional issues (i.e., infringements on
procreational/privacy rights) arising from incomplete AI statutes deemed
controlling/exclusive, courts should shun these designations. 92 In Idaho,
the AIA says its provisions “apply to all persons conceived as a result of
artificial insemination as defined herein.” The child of Kylee and Linsay
arguably was not such a person as no physician was used and thus the
child was outside of the conduct explicitly addressed in the AIA. The AIA
should not have covered the actions of Kylee and Linsay because it was
controlling. Such a reading makes Linsay’s possible use of a marital
spousal parent presumption or a voluntary parentage acknowledgment
much easier. 93

89. IDAHO C ODE § 39-5402.
90. See supra note 85 (citing Idaho statutes). As to precedent, see, e.g., In re Ewing, 529 P.2d
1296, 1298 (Idaho 1974) (nonparent must have had custody “for an appreciable period of time (in
excess of three years)” as well as show “best interests of the child”).
91. Under the Gatsby ruling, such a husband may not be a parent and may have to undertake a
formal adoption to secure childcare parentage (as spousal parentage may only apply to nonAI births
since AI births are exclusively guided by the “controlling” AIA).
92. Even when AI statutes deemed “exclusive” omit certain intended parents, courts have
employed the “equitable-parent” doctrine to find parenthood. See, e.g., Pueblo v. Haas, 2021 WL
6130700 (Mich. App. 2021) (doctrine limited to AI births to married couples). Similar decisions with
no judicial deference to legislatures on matter involving significant social problems are found when
there is a complete absence of statutes. See, e.g., In re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W. 2d 634, 653
(Wis. 2013) (enforcing, via common law precedent, a surrogacy AI pact, while observing “surrogacy
is currently a reality”).
93. There was no mention in Gatsby of any General Assembly desire to block VAPs for
intended female parents in AI births.
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The 2017 UPA provisions on AI births reject controlling/exclusive
status as it expressly recognizes parentage can arise from AI births outside
the proposed statutory AI guidelines on consent “in a record.” 94 The 2017
UPA declares that without a “record” consent, “before, on, or after the
birth of the child,” an “individual” can become a parent to an AI child if
(1) the individual had a preconception “express agreement” that the
individual and prospective birth mother “intended they both would be
parents,” 95 or (2) “for the first two years of the child’s life,” the individual
and birth mother “resided together in the same household with the child
and openly held out the child as the individual’s child.” 96 In California, an
exception to the requirement of a “writing” is found in the AI statute,
under which an “intended parent” and an AI birth mother are both parents
if there is “clear and convincing evidence that, prior to the conception . . .
the woman and the intended parent had an oral agreement that the woman
and the intended parent would both be parents of the child.” 97 Without
explicit statutory alternatives to the consent requirement in the Idaho AIA,
judicial precedents are warranted in order to respect parental intentions
and to promote a child’s best interests. Such precedents are also necessary
to meet constitutional demands.
C. Limiting AI Intended Parents
Statutes on childcare parentage arising from AI births often limit
standing to seek parentage. The Idaho AIA expressly speaks only of
preconception consent by a “woman” and “her husband,” 98 though the
Gatsby court deemed the act also applicable to a woman and her female
spouse given the federal constitutional demands of equality for same-sex
and opposite-sex married couples. 99 By contrast, as noted the 2017 UPA
94. 2017 UPA§ 704(a).
95. 2017 UPA § 704(b)(1) (need “clear-and-convincing evidence;” either the birth mother
(presumably often for child support purpose) or the individual can seek to prove such an agreement).
96. 2017 UPA §704(b)(2), which derives from 2017 UPA§ 204 (a)(2) (outside the article on
assisted reproduction). The AI birth mother is a legal parent by giving birth. 2017 UPA § 201(1)
(which excepts “genetic” and “gestational” surrogates, under Article 8 of the UPA, particularly at
801(1) and 801(2)). No explanation is given in Gatsby as to why Kylee’s parentage was not controlled
by the AIA. Such control seems contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent on the constitutional
childcare interests of those giving birth. See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 60,62
(2001) (birth mothers do not have same requirements as biological fathers in claiming U.S. citizenship
for their children because for birth mothers “real, everyday ties” during pregnancy are sufficient to
prompt protected childrearing interests).
97. C AL. F AM. C ODE § 7613(a)(2).
98. IDAHO C ODE § 39-5403 (no performance of AI (by a physician) without prior “request and
consent”).
99. Gatsby, 495 P.3d at 1002-03.
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speaks of “consent” in a record by “an individual” and a “woman giving
birth.” 100 In a California AI birth employing a nonparent semen donor, the
woman and “another intended parent” can “consent” to dual parentage. 101
The 2017 UPA and California approaches are preferable. They are
also constitutionally compelled in some instances. 102 The U.S. Supreme
Court has declared: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 103 Where the state seeks
to foreclose a certain form of AI parentage altogether, the infringements
on procreation desires must be supported by legitimate (if not compelling)
governmental interests.
Constitutional requirements on the need for legitimate state interests
has both fundamental rights and equality elements. While the U.S.
Supreme Court has been urged to extend substantive “liberty” interests in
childcare to many intended nonbiological parents, 104 in the near future
such recognitions seem unlikely. 105 Yet those similarly situated must also
be treated equally in AI laws, with distinctions between individuals and
100. 2017 UPA § 704(a) & (b) (noting that failure to “consent in a record . . . before, on, or after
birth” does not preclude AI parentage due to a preconception “express agreement” or to
residency/hold out parentage acts in the “first two years of the child’s life”).
101. C AL. F AM. C ODE § 7613(a)(1)&(2). See also C AL. F AM. C ODE § 7613(b)(2) & (3)
(recognizing intended parentage in women and men (who may or may not have provided sperm)
where “a licensed physician or surgeon or a licensed sperm bank” is not employed).
102. It also may be that procreation interests for some people intending to use their sperm in AI
settings can be limited by the state. Consider, e.g., the Idaho AIA which bars semen donations by any
person who has “any disease or defect known by him to be transmissible by genes” or who “knows
or has reason to know he has a venereal disease.” IDAHO C ODE § 39-5404. Where a donor is pursuing
parenthood via AI, similar state limits do exist. See, e.g., 52 OR. R EV. S TAT. § 677.370 (semen may
not be donated for use in AI by any person who has a disease transmissible by genes or who knows
or has reason to know he has a sexually transmitted infection); 20 ILL. C OMP.S TAT. ANN. §
2310/2310-325(b) (Class A misdemeanor to knowingly use semen of an AI donor “who has tested
positive for exposure to HIV”).
103. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (contraception access case with no majority
opinion). The Eisenstadt declaration has since been deemed, with other precedents like Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1983), to teach “that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childrearing from unjustified intrusions by the State.” Carey v. Population Services International,
431 U.S. 678, 687 (1987).
104. See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 31, at 2357-59 (how “courts might extend due process
protection to social bonds in the absence of biological connection”); Douglas NeJaime, The
Constitution of Parenthood, 72 S TANFORD L. R EV. 261, 376-79 (2020) (the consequences, and
difficulties in, applying a recognized “liberty interest for those who form non-biological parent-chil d
bonds”).
105. Parness, Federal Childcare Parents, supra note 5, at 978-95 (describing, and criticizing,
U.S. Supreme Court deferral to state lawmaking on defining parents who possess superior federal
constitutional childcare rights).
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couples, or between wed and unwed couples, being, at least, rational.
Where distinctions are suspect because of their focus on immutable
characteristics or discrete groups, their justifications must be more
significant. 106
As to equality, the Gatsby court held the U.S. Supreme Court samesex marriage ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges mandated that same sex
married couples should have equal access to dual parentage via AI births
under the AIA as had by opposite sex married couples. 107 Do equality
principles not also demand that a single woman can secure parentage via
a nonsurrogacy AI birth facilitated by a sperm donor who waived any
parental interests? And do equality principles not also demand that a
married or unmarried opposite sex couple can secure dual parentage via
an AI birth which did not involve the sperm donor’s waiver of parental
interests? The 2017 UPA, encompassing such possible single or dual
parentage, 108 recognizes the need for equality.
As well, certain parentage recognitions beyond the Idaho AIA seem
constitutionally mandated by substantive due process, as with the single
intended parent giving birth or with a sperm provider who intends
parentage via surrogacy or nonsurrogacy AI. The U.S. Supreme Court has
generally recognized that parental childcare interests arise automatically
for a birth mother whose child was conceived through sex. 109 Why not
similar parentage for a nonsurrogate employing AI? As to sperm
providers, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the biological father,
in a birth involving consensual sex, has a constitutionally-protected
interest in developing a parent-child relationship with his offspring,
except when the child is born into an intact marriage (under Obergefell,
either same sex or opposite). 110 That exception does not even apply in
states whose separate constitutional privacy interests extend beyond the
interests protected by federal due process. 111 With or without the
exception, should not sperm providers in AI settings with unwed
birthgivers be treated like sperm providers in consensual sex settings,
106. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 14-16 (2015).
107. Gatsby, 495 P.3d at 1002-03.
108. 2017 UPA § 703 (an “individual” consents to AI, with a woman, to be a parent of a child”).
109. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60.
110. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (an unwed biological father of a child born of
consensual sex has a parental opportunity interest which is grasped by forming a “significant
custodial, personal, or financial relationship” with his offspring). Though the interest in Lehr is
perhaps limited to children born to women married to others as in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 128,132 (1989) (four Justices).
111. See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190-91 (Iowa 1999) (unwed biological
father of child born of sex to a woman married to another has a liberty interest in challenging the
husband’s paternity, a view rejected in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128).
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especially because only in the former setting is evidence of intended
parentage usually required.
The limits on AI intended parents in the Idaho AIA and in similar
statutes should be removed. If there is no removal by legislators, then
removal by courts is appropriate as there is no deference due
unconstitutional legislation.
D. Limiting Parental Interest Waivers
In AI birth settings, there can be: a sperm donor who waived any
parental childcare interest before insemination; a sperm donor who
waived any parental childcare interests after insemination but before birth;
a sperm donor who waived any parental childcare interests only after
birth; a sperm donor who, prior to insemination, intended to be a childcare
parent, but who shed that desire after insemination, during the pregnancy,
or after birth; and, a sperm donor who earlier waived any parental
childcare interests, but who later, preinsemination, postinsemination, or
postbirth, sought to be a parent under law. What, if anything, do federal
and state constitutions have to say about parental interest waivers and their
retractions?
Unfortunately, direct constitutional precedents are rare. Some
rulings, though, are pertinent to AI sperm donors. In Lehr v. Robertson,
the U.S. Supreme Court did recognize that those with male genetic ties to
children, born of consensual sex, do have potential parental interests
which no other men possess. 112 In an adoption case setting, such interests
were deemed waived by a man who failed to timely establish a
“significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship” with his
offspring. 113 The timely establishment norms basically have been left to
the states as long as they are within federal due process constraints.
Waivers can include a parental opportunity loss arising from a failure to
follow statutory guidelines, as with a paternity registration, even where
those guidelines, and the pregnancy and birth, were not actually known to
the genetic father. 114 Precedent thus suggests that unintentional parental
interest waivers can be sustained. In Michael. H. v. Gerald D., the U.S.
Supreme Court did not mandate that states recognize this parental
opportunity interest in an unwed genetic father whose sex with a woman

112. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 251 n.5 (citing N.Y. DOM. R EL. L.§ 111-a(2)(C), which embodies N. Y. S OC. S ERV.
L.§ 372-c (“putative father registry”)).
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married to another prompted a birth into an intact family of two who have
raised, and wish to continue to raise, the child. 115
A sperm donor via AI should be treated comparably under state law,
given Lehr, to genetic father of a child born of consensual sex to an unwed
mother. Thus, his future parental intentions and pregnancy support,
particularly accompanied by the comparable, one-time intentions of the
woman later giving birth, should be respected.
Any recognition of a “record” consent to intended parentage arising
from an AI birth, as well as a sperm donor’s waiver of parental interests,
could be limited to preconception settings. Postconception but prebirth
parental intentions and parental interest waivers can be addressed in VAPs
(though not where acknowledging parents are limited by law to gamete
donors). Postbirth parental intentions and parental interest waivers in AI
births can be accommodated by VAPs, by formal adoptions, and by
residency/hold out and de facto parentage (where gametes donations are
not required).
The Idaho AIA on semen donors requires preinsemination donations
and waivers by men who are not the husbands of the women upon whom
AI is performed, 116 as well as preinsemination written requests and
consents by the husbands of such women. 117 Upon such donations and
consents, no statutory provision in Idaho allows donors to retract their
parental interest waivers or husbands to retract their consents. These
inabilities to retract, at least preinsemination, may run afoul of
constitutional procreation interests. Constitutional difficulties, due to the
lack of retraction opportunities on waivers and consents, are especially
likely where inseminations would come long after the waivers/consents
were first secured. Constitutional issues are far less likely to arise where
waiver/consent retractions, by statute, cannot be undertaken after a certain
period of time, which provides some assurance to a prospective birth
mother that the rug will not be pulled out from under her at the last
moment.
The 2017 UPA has no provisions on retracting waivers by donors pre
or post insemination, 118 with the waivers of parental interests undertaken
preinsemination. 119 As for an individual who “consents . . . to assisted
reproduction by a woman with the intent to be a parent,” the 2017 UPA
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
assisted

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130.
IDAHO C ODE § 39-5401.
Id. § 39-5403(1).
2017 UPA § 702.
2017 UPA § 102(9) (a donor is “an individual who provides gametes intended for use in
reproduction”).
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allows such an individual to “withdraw consent at any time before a
transfer results in a pregnancy.” 120 The ability of an intended parent, but
not a donor, to undertake a preinsemination retraction raises eyebrows. As
the Supreme Court declared, the right of privacy embodies individual
freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion into decisions on
“whether to bear or beget a child.” 121 Is a sperm donor who earlier agreed
to waive parental interests begetting a child? To facilitate family
planning, it would be sensible to allow a donor to retract a parental waiver
within a certain time after a donation is completed, and to allow an
intended parent to retract within so many days after consent is completed
or within so many days before insemination.
IV. CONCLUSION
American state AI laws vary greatly in their approaches to childcare
parentage. Too often they are fraught with due process, equal protection
and privacy problems, particularly for same-sex couples, wed or unwed,
and for single women. Illustrative is the Idaho Artificial Insemination Act,
passed in 1982 and generally following the 1973 UPA. While the 2017
UPA, followed in some states, is less troublesome, it too has problems in
its approach to parentage in AI births. Given separation of powers issues
in childcare parent cases, state commitments to democratic principles and
robust debate on public policy matters, and federal lawmakers’ reluctance
to define parentage, state legislators should specially address childcare
parentage in artificial insemination birth settings.

120. 2017 UPA§ 707(a).
121. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.

